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ABSTRACT
This paper presents the Code of Conduct for arbitrators in CETA, which will apply to 
investor-state dispute settlement initiated under Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement concluded between the European Union and Canada. The Code of Conduct 
for arbitrators constitutes an innovation in investment treaties, especially taking into 
account that it is said to be binding. Therefore, in this article the provisions of the Code 
as well as its role and significance will be examined to assess whether the Code is a mile-
stone in dealing with ethical issues in investment arbitration.
KEYWORDS
CETA, investment arbitration, code of conduct, ethical code for arbitrators
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dominik Horodyski
Chair of Private Economic Law
Faculty of Law and Administration




This paper tries to analyze the provisions of Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA)1 establishing a Code of Conduct for arbitrators. The 
Code of Conduct for arbitrators in CETA has been announced as the first bin-
ding ethical code that will apply to investment disputes initiated under CETA.2 
It is considered to oblige arbitrators to continuously disclose any possible 
conflict of interest as well as to maintain their independency and impartiality.3 
In this paper I argue that binding Code of Conduct is certainly a step into 
right direction to protect impartiality and independence of arbitrators as well 
as to ameliorate the system of investment arbitration in general, however its 
provisions, structure and mechanisms it deploys are far from expectations and 
do not resolve concerns presented by critics and researchers. The Code does 
not include the specificities of investment disputes in sufficient manner; it does 
not decisively solve problems associated with impartiality and independence of 
arbitrators by, for example, creating distinct and separate profession of invest-
ment arbitrator that would be intended to solve investment disputes under 
CETA. Moreover, it does not provide institutions authorized to control and 
sanction arbitrators who have acted contrary to ethical standards as well as 
clear mechanisms that would apply in such situations. Therefore, its meaning 
may in practice be reduced. 
In the first part of the paper I will present the mechanisms of investment 
arbitration introduced in CETA as a background for further considerations 
concerning the Code of Conduct for arbitrators; furthermore I will outline the 
1 The Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement is a free-trade agreement be-
tween Canada and the European Union. CETA tackles a wide range of issues to make 
business between Canada and EU easier. It is going to remove customs duties, end limita-
tions in access to public contracts, openup services’ market, offer predictable conditions for 
investors and, last but not least, help prevent illegal copying of EU innovations and tradi-
tional product, compare: CETA – Summary of the Final Negotiating Results, [online] http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/december/tradoc_152982.pdf [accessed: 10.11.2015]; 
A. Cosbey, Inside CETA: Unpacking the EU-Canada Free Trade Deal, [online] http://www.
ictsd.org/bridges-news/biores/news/inside-ceta-unpacking-the-eu-canada-free-trade-deal 
[accessed: 10.11.2015]; Kompleksowa umowa gospodarczo-handlowa (CETA), [online] http: 
//ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/index_pl.htm [accessed: 10.11.2015].
2 Investment Provisions in the EU-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CETA), [on-
line] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151918.pdf [accessed: 
10.11.2015], p. 3. 
3 How Investment Protection Affects the “Right to Regulate”, [online] http://isds-
blog.com/tag/ceta/ [accessed: 10.11.2015]. 
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content of Code of Conduct envisaged in CETA Consolidated Text4 in the view 
of other similar instruments like, for example, International Bar Association 
Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (IBA Guide-
lines).5 Finally, I will try to answer a question if the Code of Conduct set up 
in CETA creates a new quality in establishing standards of conduct for arbitrat- 
ors involved in investment disputes.
ISDS IN CETA 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) has been one of the most criticized 
elements in CETA.6 Critics argue that ISDS has been originally created for 
settling disputes between an investor from a developed country with stable 
legal system and a developing country, where legal protection based on strong 
standards and binding laws could not have been guaranteed. In such situation 
the justified claims of private investors might not be sufficiently protected be-
fore state national courts that could have been strongly influenced by the na-
tional authorities. Therefore the investors’ interests would risk to be exposed to 
the omnipotence of state powers.7 To counter this threat ISDS system has been 
introduced to grant investors that their claims will be reviewed and decided by 
an independent and impartial body in a form of an international arbitral 
4 Consolidated CETA Text, [online] http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/sep-
tember/tradoc_152806.pdf [accessed: 10.11.2015]. 
5 International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International 
Arbitration, adopted by resolution of the IBA Council on Thursday 23 October 2014, 
available at: IBA Guides, Rules and Other Free Materials, [online] http://www.ibanet.org/
Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx#Standards, Principles and 
Ethics [accessed: 10.11.2015].
6 Seattle to Brussels Network, [online] https://www.tni.org/files/download/seattle_to_
brussels_ceta_analysis.pdf [accessed: 10.11.2015]; N. Bernasconi-Osterwalder, The Draft 
Investment Chapter of the Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement: 
A Step Backwards for the EU and Canada?, “Investment Treaty News”, Issue 4. Volume 
3. June 2013, [online] http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2013/iisd_itn_june_2013_en.pdf [accessed: 
10.11.2015], pp. 10–13; C. Lewis, „Reformed” or Not, Corporate Handouts in Trade 
Agreements Are as Dangerous as Ever, [online] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/courte-
nay-lewis/reformed-or-not-corporate_b_6277200.html [accessed: 10.11.2015]; A. Cos-
bey, op. cit.
7 S. Balthasar, Spory o przyszłość arbitrażu inwestycyjnego w Unii Europejskiej, 
„Przegląd Prawa Handlowego” 2014, nr 2, p. 41; C. Wiśniewski, O. Górska, Zakres 
jurysdykcji trybunału arbitrażowego w świetle dwustronnych umów o ochronie i popie-
raniu inwestycji, „Przegląd Prawa Handlowego” 2012, nr 7, pp. 10–11. 
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tribunal.8 However, between EU and Canada this threat does not exist because 
both legal systems of the parties to CETA are strong, reliable and independent 
from executive power.9 Therefore, there is small risk that national courts of EU 
Member States will favor their respective states over legitimate interests of 
investors and violate the rule of fair and just process. Reversely, it can be 
pointed out also that in Canada national courts operate independently so they 
will examine the cases filed by EU investors without prejudice. It is therefore 
questionable whether ISDS is whatsoever needed in CETA.10 
In addition, investment arbitration has insofar gained murky reputation. It has 
been accused of favoring international corporations and allowing them to seek 
billions of dollars in compensation for public interest policies that corporations 
allege reduce their profits.11 The ISDS mechanism is deemed to empower corpor- 
ations to sue national governments in private arbitration proceedings over hazard- 
ous waste safeguards, fracking bans, nuclear energy phase-outs and minimal 
wage policies.12 It has been also pointed out that investment arbitration allows 
private investors to challenge national regulations adopted for protection of rel- 
evant citizens’ interests, which undermines the state right to regulate as well as 
to bypass national court and force the sovereign states to conduct proceedings 
before an arbitral tribunal in non-transparent and non-controllable method.13 
The EU Commission (that since the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 has competences 
over foreign direct investment)14 explains, however, that the ISDS in CETA will 
be ameliorated and abovementioned threats will be eradicated. The Commission 
8 P. Muchlinski, F. Ortino, C. Schreuer, Oxford Handbook of International Invest-
ment Law, Oxford 2008, pp. 725–728. 
9 CETA: Trading Away Democracy, [online] http://corporateeurope.org/internation-
al-trade/2014/11/ceta-trading-away-democracy [accessed: 10.11.2015].
10 According to EU Commission the ISDS is needed in CETA to provide clearer and 
more precise investment protection standards; provide for new and clearer rules on the 
conduct of procedures in arbitration tribunals – including complete transparency; as well 
as improve the functioning of arbitral tribunals, compare: Investment Provisions in the 
EU-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CETA), op. cit. 
11 C. Lewis, op. cit.
12 Ibidem. 
13 N. Bernasconi-Osterwalder, op. cit., p. 12; G. Domański, M. Świątkowski, Naru-
szenie przypisywanej państwu umowy z inwestorem zagranicznym a naruszenie traktatu 
o ochronie inwestycji, „Przegląd Prawa Handlowego” 2006, nr 11, 2006, pp. 18–19; 
M. Dziurda, C. Wiśniewski, Wpływ umów BIT na suwerenność państw, „Przegląd Prawa 
Handlowego” 2013, nr 12, pp. 13–18. 
14 S. Woolcock, EU Trade and Investment Policymaking After the Lisbon Treaty, 
“Intereconomics”, Vol. 45, No. 1, January/February 2010, pp. 22–25, [online] https://
www.ceps.eu/system/files/article/2010/02/22-25-Woolcock_0.pdf [accessed: 10.11.2015].
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plans to reform the current mechanisms by introducing several changes.15 One of 
the proposed solutions concerns introducing the Code of Conduct for arbitrators 
that will contain ethical rules and will apply to all investment disputes initiated 
under CETA. According to EU Commission, the Code of Conduct will prevent 
conflict of interests, which are likely to occur providing the number of potential 
investment disputes arising out of CETA and will provide effective mechanisms 
of replacing an arbitrator who is not complying with the Code. The decision in 
this regard will be taken by an outside party, which is the Secretary – General of 
the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and 
not by the fellow arbitrators. The Commission points out that the fellow arbitrators 
risk being perceived as being more lax on possible conflicts of interest and hence 
might not effectively intervene when possible conflicts occur.16
STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF CODE OF CONDUCT IN CETA
As it has been presented above, the Code of Conduct is only one instrument of 
improving the investment arbitration but definitely one with the strongest im-
pact on influencing arbitrators and their work. It is agreed that international 
15 For example by: 1) introducing the right of the EU and Canada to regulate to 
pursue legitimate public policy objectives such as the protection of health, safety, or 
the environment; 2) providing for a precise definition of “Fair and Equitable treat-
ment”; 3) providing detailed language on what constitutes indirect expropriation; 
4) issuing of compulsory licenses in accordance with WTO provisions guaranteeing 
access to medicines cannot be considered an expropriation; 5) covering by the defini-
tion of investment only assets that possess the characteristics of an investment, such 
as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or 
the assumption of risk, and a certain duration; 6) not protecting so-called “shell” or 
“mailbox” companies; 7) exceptionally strong protections against frivolous claims; 
8) encouragement of alternative dispute resolution; 8) limited post-establishment 
rights; 9) prohibitions on seeking remedies in domestic courts and through ISDS at the 
same time; 10) full transparency—all documents will be public, all hearings open, 
interested parties (NGOs) can make submissions; 11) introducing a roster of arbitra-
tors; 12) effective mechanisms for the parties to the agreement (the EU and Canada) 
to issue binding interpretations; 13) a possible appellate mechanism, compare: Invest-
ment Provisions in the EU-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CETA), op. cit., pp. 1–6; 
N. Bernasconi-Osterwalder, H. Mann, A Response to the European Commission’s De-
cember 2013 Document “Investment Provisions in the EU-Canada Free Trade Agree-
ment (CETA)”, [online] https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2014/reponse_eu_ce- 
ta.pdf [accessed: 10.11.2015], pp. 4–25.
16 Investment Provisions in the EU-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CETA), op. cit., p. 3. 
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arbitration relays on trust.17 The trust between parties but most of all between 
parties and arbitrators creates the value of arbitration. The parties must have 
confidence that arbitrators will be impartial, independent and will have the 
necessary moral, professional and personal qualification to fairly and properly 
settle a dispute. When the trust disappears, arbitration will no longer be an 
effective method of resolving cases.18 At the same time the proliferation of 
potential disputes that will be brought before arbitral tribunals will definitely 
cause the increase of number of new arbitrators who will be needed to handle 
them. Therefore, tightening the profession of an investment arbitrator by impo-
sing on them a binding Code of Conduct, which will set up standards of acting 
for all arbitrators appearing in investment cases under CETA, will contribute 
to the increase of trust between parties and arbitrators. It will also influence 
harmonization and even unification of standards applying to conflict of interests 
that arbitrators may encounter as well as it will have major positive impact on 
the ISDS in CETA as a fair and effective method of settling disputes. 
The Code of Conduct is necessary in investment arbitration for many reas- 
ons. First, it is a required tool for arbitrators to guide them in case of conflict 
of interests that may easily occur, especially taking into account the number 
of potential disputes that will result out of CETA. Second, it is crucial from 
the states’ perspective. It has been acknowledged that the independence of 
arbitrators is problematic resulting from the fact that arbitrators are generally 
lawyers from international law firms who appear in some cases as counsels 
and in other as arbitrators (judges), which might place at risk their imparti- 
ality and independence. Third, it is justified due to the growing institutional- 
ization and judicialization of investment arbitration.19 Arbitrator commences 
(rightfully) to be treated more as a profession that requires professional training, 
competences and qualification. Therefore, there are emerging regular mechan- 
isms that are to establish certain standards but also watch if arbitrators are 
observing them.20 
Hence it is vital that the EU Commission recognizes the problems connected 
with arbitrators’ impartiality and independence. To address this issue the Code 
of Conduct is formulated in accordance with the International Bar Association 
Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration with which arbit- 
17 D. S. Rajoo, Importance of Arbitrators’ Ethics and Integrity in Ensuring Quality 
Arbitrations, “Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal” 2013, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 329–347, 
[online] http://ssrn.com/abstract=2397659 [accessed: 10.11.2015]. 
18 Ibidem, p. 339.
19 J. Rajski, Etos arbitrażu, „Przegląd Prawa Handlowego” 2013, nr 5, p. 4. 
20 Ibidem, pp. 4–5; M. H. Koziński, [in:] System Prawa Handlowego, t. VIII: Arbi-
traż Handlowy, red. A. Szumański, Warszawa 2010, pp. 934–935. 
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rators are to comply.21 IBA Guidelines are the most popular document that 
guides arbitrators in case of conflict of interests. They have already gained wide 
acceptance within the international arbitration community. Arbitrators com-
monly use the IBA Guidelines when making decisions about prospective 
appointments and disclosures. Likewise, parties and their counsel frequently 
consider the Guidelines in assessing the impartiality and independence of arbit- 
rators, and arbitral institutions and courts also often consult the Guidelines in 
considering challenges to arbitrators. According to the IBA Guidelines’ general 
principle: ‘every arbitrator shall be impartial and independent of the parties at 
the time of accepting an appointment to serve and shall remain so until the final 
award has been rendered or the proceedings have otherwise finally terminated’. 
To achieve this aim the IBA Guidelines contain provisions as to disclosure of 
information, conflicts of interest, relationship of the arbitrators, the scope of 
application, duty of the parties and the arbitrator. The popularity of IBA Guide-
lines is compromised by the fact that they have a form of soft law and subse-
quently their provisions are not legally binding.22 
The Code of Conduct for arbitrators in CETA is based on IBA Guidelines 
provisions, however the Code employs different wording and has different 
structure. The Code is added to CETA as Annex II and contains 8 titles and 21 
articles. In first part of the Code the principle notions like arbitrator, candidate 
for arbitrator and proceedings are defined. Then, under first section, titled Re-
sponsibility to the process, the fundamental principle of proper conduct of 
proceedings is set out. It states: ‘Every candidate and member shall avoid im-
propriety and the appearance of impropriety, shall be independent and impar-
tial, shall avoid direct and indirect conflicts of interests and shall observe high 
standards of conduct so that the integrity and impartiality of the dispute settle-
ment mechanism is preserved.’23 
Second section is titled Disclosure Obligations. It contains a vast regulation 
indicating what the candidates for arbitrators must reveal. The code does not 
repeat the IBA red, orange and green lists but instead indicates in direct way 
what should be disclosed. For example, it requires that the candidates must di-
sclose any interest, relationship or matter that is likely to affect their indepen-
dence or impartiality or that might reasonably create an appearance of impro-
priety or bias in the proceeding. In particular, candidates for arbitrators should 
disclose any financial interest and any financial interest of the candidate’s 
21 IBA Guides, Rules and Other Free Materials, op. cit.
22 P. Hodges, The Proliferation of “Soft Laws” in International Arbitration: Time to 
Draw the Line?, [in:] Austrian Yearbook on International Arbitration, eds. C. Klausegger 
et al., Vienna 2015, pp. 205–229. 
23 Consolidated CETA Text, op. cit., p. 480. 
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employer, partner, business associate or family member in the proceeding or in 
its outcome and in any other relating proceedings that may interfere with this 
proceedings. As well as any past or existing financial, business, professional, 
family or social relationship with any interested parties in the proceeding, or 
their counsel, or any such relationship involving a candidate’s employer, partner, 
business associate or family member; and public advocacy or legal or other 
representation concerning an issue in dispute in the proceeding or involving the 
same goods.24 
Third section is titled Duties of Members and regulates the conduct of ar-
bitrators during the proceedings. It imposes on arbitrators an obligation to 
perform their duties thoroughly and expeditiously with fairness and diligence. 
As well as they must not delegate their duties to other persons. In addition the 
arbitrators should take proper measures to ensure that their assistants and staff 
comply with the provisions of the code.25 This section is distinctive because 
the IBA Guidelines do not contain a general obligation imposed on arbitrators 
to perform their duties thoroughly and expeditiously. 
The title of the fourth section is Independence and Impartiality of Members. 
It repeats and strengthens the requirement of arbitrator independence by stating 
that they shall not be influenced by self-interest, outside pressure, political 
considerations, public clamor, and loyalty to a Party or fear of criticism. In 
addition, an arbitrator shall not accept any benefit that would interfere or even 
appear to interfere with the proper performance of his/her duties. An arbitrator 
may not use his/her position on the arbitration panel to advance any interests 
and should avoid the impression that others are in a special position to influ-
ence her or him. An arbitrator may not allow financial, business, professional, 
family or social relationships or responsibilities to influence her or his conduct 
or judgment. A member must avoid entering into any relationship or acquiring 
any financial interest that is likely to affect her or his impartiality or that might 
reasonably create an appearance of impropriety or bias.26 
Section five titled Obligations of Former Members imposes on former ar-
bitrators a duty to avoid actions that may create the appearance that they were 
biased in carrying out their duties or derived advantage from the decision or 
ruling of the arbitration panel.27
Under section six, the Confidentiality is regulated. It imposes general and 
wide obligation of maintaining any information concerning proceedings or 
acquired during proceedings in private and prescribes using any such inform- 
24 Ibidem, pp. 480–481. 
25 Ibidem, p. 481. 
26 Ibidem, pp. 481–482. 
27 Ibidem, p. 482. 
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ation to gain personal advantage or advantage of others or to adversely affect 
the interests of others.28
Section seven and eight concern respectively Expenses and Mediators.29
DRAWBACK OF THE CODE OF CONDUCT
Although the general idea of introducing the legally binding Code of Conduct 
for arbitrators deserves approval, the initial project of this document is far from 
expectations. 
First, it should be pointed out that the Code of Conduct is not decisively 
binding. Pursuant to Article X.25: Constitution of the Tribunal of the Consoli-
dated CETA Text: ‘Arbitrators shall comply with the International Bar Associ-
ation Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration or any 
supplemental rules adopted pursuant to Article X.42(2)(b) (Committee on 
Services and Investment).’30 It means that arbitrators in fact will have a choice 
between the Code of Conduct, established in accordance with CETA and IBA 
Guidelines.31 Provided that IBA Guidelines have been created for commercial 
arbitration, choosing them will not significantly change the ethical approach of 
arbitrators to investment arbitration. In addition its application might be re-
duced due to the fact that IBA Guidelines are already known and in use, so 
arbitrators may be likely to choose them as an instrument they know instead of 
complying with new rules with yet unknown interpretation. 
Second, despite the quality of IBA Guidelines, they have been created to 
serve to international commercial arbitration and hence they do not recognize 
the particularisms of investment disputes. Therefore, the Code of Conduct in 
CETA should be more properly adjusted to address specific concerns on arbi-
trator conflicts in investment arbitration. The parties should not have a choice 
between the IBA Guidelines or a special code but instead the Code should 
integrate and build on the IBA Rules and bring in investment-specific elements. 
For example, the Code of Conduct should clearly state that arbitrators in an 




30 Ibidem, p. 171. 
31 M. Maes, Investment Protection in the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement (CETA), published on 5 March 2014, [online] http://eu-secret-
deals.info/upload/2014/02/Investment-in-CETA-MarcMaes-S2B-analysis-140306.pdf 
[accessed: 10.11.2015], p. 8. 
32  N. Bernasconi-Osterwalder, op. cit., p. 13. 
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Third, the Code of Conduct’s function has been to strengthen impartiality 
and independence of the arbitrators. This objective is to be accomplished by 
providing ethical rules to eliminate conflict of interests as well as eliminating 
situations in which arbitrators are deciding in favor of a party that has nomi-
nated her/him. To achieve this objective EU Commission has enhanced the 
roster of arbitrators as an implementation of the Code of Conduct. It is pointed 
out that if arbitrators were chosen by lot from the roster and not nominated by 
parties, it would firmly enhance their impartiality and reduce their eagerness to 
decide in favor of one party also in expectation to be nominated by this party 
in next case. Unfortunately, choosing arbitrators from the roster has not been 
adopted and roster itself has been introduced only within limited scope. Pursu-
ant to Section 3 Article 14.7. of the CETA Consolidated Text, the parties shall 
consult to chose arbitration panel within 10 working days, which means that 
first two arbitrators are nominated by the investor and the state unilaterally and 
both parties must agree to chose the chairperson.33 The roster only comes into 
play when the parties fail to appoint the presiding arbitrator or fail to appoint 
their own arbitrator.34 It means that in fact the roster system under CETA is 
more a facade decoration than is designed to truly solve a problem with impar-
tiality and pressure made on arbitrators by nominating parties because a situ- 
ation when a party fails to appoint its arbitrator seems to be very rare. 
Fourth, the Code of Conduct for arbitrators, apart from serving arbitrators 
themselves by guiding their actions and aiding them in case of conflict of in-
terests, serves also additional objectives. It should legally verify arbitrators’ 
conduct and provide mechanisms, institutions and sanctions that would com-
plement the system and come into play when ethical provisions are violated. 
The need to establish high guarantees of impartiality of arbitrators (even sim-
ilar to those of judges in national courts) is extremely important in Investor- 
-State arbitration, which many times concerns public matters and is (or at least 
should be and is commencing to be) exposed to public scrutiny.35 Not only are 
the investment disputes concerning elementary human rights, environmental 
issues and state’s right to regulate but also the amount of compensation de-
manded by investors against states and associated responsibility of arbitrators 
justifies the highest possible impartiality and independence. In this context all 
inevitable connections between investors and investment arbitrators, who come 
from most influential and cosmopolitan law corporations, contribute to reduc-
tion of trust in investment arbitration as a fair and efficient method of solving 
33 Consolidated CETA Text, op. cit., pp. 465–466.
34 Ibidem, pp. 465–466; N. Bernasconi-Osterwalder, H. Mann, op. cit., p. 22. 
35 D. Euler, M. Gehring, M. Scherer, Transparency in International Investment Ar-
bitration, Cambridge 2015, pp. 1–27. 
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investment disputes but what is even more important they create a ground for 
abuses and possibilities of corruption.36 To counter this problem the Code of 
Conduct should provide mechanisms that will control the arbitrators’ conduct, 
allow holding them responsible for their wrongdoings and imposing on them 
certain sanctions. Unfortunately, the Code of Conduct in CETA does not stip-
ulate what happens when an arbitrator violates the Code of Conduct apart from 
the right of both parties to demand to replacement of arbitrator. Pursuant to art. 
23 of the Annex I of the CETA Consolidated Text, when the party considers 
that an arbitrator does not comply with the Code of Conduct, the party must 
notify the other party and if they agree, they replace the arbitrator. If they do 
not agree, the chairperson is entitled to choose an arbitrator and his decision is 
final.37 It means that the Code of Conduct in CETA does not deal in fact with 
the problem of violating its provisions if the only sanction that can be imposed 
on an arbitrator is removing him/her from the proceedings (which of course 
may have sound consequences because it tarnishes his/her credibility and re-
duces his/her chances to be appointed in next proceedings).
Fifth, more emphasis should be put in the Code of Conduct on the CETA 
Institutional Body’s powers relating to administering disputes. This Authority 
is introduced in CETA Consolidated Text as an organ that has many compe-
tences, for example to manage the implementation of the Chapter XX: Techni-
cal Barriers to Trade; to address any issue that a Party raises related to the 
development, adoption or application of standards, technical regulations or 
conformity assessment procedures; to facilitate discussion of the assessment of 
risk or hazard conducted by the other Party; to encourage cooperation between 
the standardization and conformity assessment bodies of the Parties; to ex-
change information on standards, technical regulations, or conformity assess-
ment procedures.38 When it comes to ISDS its role is similar to the Secretariat 
and the Court of international arbitration institutions that administer arbitra-
tions’ proceedings in spite of the fact that investment disputes are administered 
by separate arbitration rules chosen by the parties.39 For example, the CETA 
Institutional Body establishes a list of arbitrators to form a roster and adminis-
ters it by verifying if the arbitrators from the list meet imposed requirements 
and conform with the CETA; it draws by lot the members of the arbitration 
panel from the list in case the parties are unable to agree on the composition 
of the arbitration panel within stipulated time. The constitution of CETA 
36 T. Meshel, The Use and Misuse of the Corruption Defence in International Invest-
ment Arbitration, “Journal of International Arbitration” 2013, Issue 3, pp. 267–281.
37 Consolidated CETA Text, op. cit., p. 475.
38 Ibidem, p. 89. 
39 Ibidem, pp. 168–169.
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Institutional Body is a positive and necessary implementation to CETA in gen-
eral but to ISDS system in particular. However, its competences as to admin-
istering disputes should be enhanced, for example it should be the CETA Insti-
tutional Body that receives the notification from the parties about non-compli-
ance with the Code of Conduct by the arbitrators as well as the CETA 
Institutional Body should take final decision about exclusion such arbitrator 
from the proceedings and not the chairperson who might be acquainted with 
such arbitrator and reluctant to exclude her/him from the proceedings. 
CONCLUSIONS
The need to improve ISDS as a system of settling investment disputes in CETA 
has been commonly acknowledged.40 Apart from many changes to the existing 
system the introduction of the Code of Conduct was viewed as an innovation 
distinct from existing ethical codes because it meant to be biding and related 
to the needs of investment disputes. Truly binding code of conduct was supposed 
to govern not only ethical rules applied in conflict of interests and disclosure 
of documents but to create a regulation encompassing standards of competence, 
possible certification and licensing of investment arbitrators settling disputes 
under CETA, disciplinary provisions that would apply in case of breach of the 
Code of Conduct, independent regulatory or supervisory bodies that would 
watch arbitrators and intervene in case of breach of ethical standards as well 
as general professionalization and institutionalization of ISDS under CETA, for 
example by choosing arbitrators by lot from the roster administered by CETA 
Institutional Body or even by creating a permanent arbitration court that would 
deal with all matters resulting from ISDS under CETA.41 Such changes, which 
are aimed at lifting from investment arbitration the opacity veil and exposing 
its conduct, procedures and arbitrators to public light as well as subject the 
proceedings to public scrutiny, will significantly contribute to better assessment 
and better functioning of investment arbitration. Unfortunately, the Code of 
Conduct in CETA lacks abovementioned innovations and proposes instead a set 
of directives embodied in a soft law instrument.
40 Compare: European Parliament Resolution of 6 April 2011 on the Future European 
International Investment Policy (2010/2203(INI)), [online] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-0141+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN 
[accessed: 10.11.2015]. 
41 M. McIlwrath, Professionalizing Arbitration: A Response to the New York Times 
Articles on Privatizing Justice, [online] http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/11/04/
professionalizing-arbitration-a-response-to-the-new-york-times-articles-on-arbitration/ 
[accessed: 10.11.2015]; J. Rajski, op. cit., p. 7.
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Hence, it might be concluded that the presented Code of Conduct in CETA 
is more a harbinger of conclusive and consecutive changes that hopefully will 
come than the change itself. 
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